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The Politics of Scale, Position, and Place in the Governance of
Water Resources in the Mekong Region
Louis Lebel1, Po Garden1, and Masao Imamura1

ABSTRACT. The appropriate scales for science, management, and decision making cannot be
unambiguously derived from physical characteristics of water resources. Scales are a joint product of social
and biophysical processes. The politics-of-scale metaphor has been helpful in drawing attention to the ways
in which scale choices are constrained overtly by politics, and more subtly by choices of technologies,
institutional designs, and measurements. In doing so, however, the scale metaphor has been stretched to
cover a lot of different spatial relationships. In this paper, we argue that there are benefits to understanding
—and actions to distinguish—issues of scale from those of place and position. We illustrate our arguments
with examples from the governance of water resources in the Mekong region, where key scientific
information is often limited to a few sources. Acknowledging how actors’ interests fit along various spatial,
temporal, jurisdictional, and other social scales helps make the case for innovative and more inclusive
means for bringing multi-level interests to a common forum. Deliberation can provide a check on the extent
of shared understanding and key uncertainties.
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INTRODUCTION

actors, and is likely to be an on-going, dynamic,
economic and political process (Delaney and
Leitner 1997).

Over the past decade, there has been a burgeoning
literature unpacking the conventional belief that
spatial scales are somehow given. Political
geographers have documented for diverse situations
how different social actors constrain, create, and
shift scales and levels (Cash et al. in preparation) to
serve their own interests (Swyngedouw 1997a, b).
Actors can change power and authority by working
at different spatial levels. They can alter access to
resources, and the decision-making processes with
respect to those resources. Scale choices can be a
means of inclusion or exclusion. Making an analysis
at a particular level may in itself be an expression
of power (Swyngedouw 1997b). Environmental
assessments, for example, are subject to biases
arising from choice of scales (Lebel 2005). Actors
help produce scales through their activities, and
scales, in turn, constrain and guide these activities
by providing (or taking away) resources (Williams
1999). Scale is shaped by the understanding of

In a process aptly labeled “state simplification”
(Scott 1998), states first appeal to wider interests as
they go about simplifying diverse local systems, and
then use the newly unified systems to rationalize
development planning and environmental management.
People, institutions, and landscapes are made to fit
levels and scales in the states’ systems of accounting
and monitoring. Local-level knowledge and
institutions are seen as local in scope, relevance, and
power, whereas the rules and knowledge of the state
have much bigger scope and significance. The
capacity of states to circumscribe how scale is
represented—whether through policies, laws, or
media campaigns, and, if necessary, reinforced
through threats and exercise of force—has most of
the time far exceeded those of other actors working
at more local levels. This capacity is further
reinforced by state control of data gathering,
analysis, and dissemination. Higher levels win, and
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winning shifts values more and more in the direction
of the higher, state-like levels (Morrill 1999). The
greater power of larger places and higher levels has
several underlying reasons, including: the
dependence of local areas on other places; the
greater mobilization capacity of interest groups at
higher levels; the heterogeneity of interests and
attitudes across local areas; and the dominance of
national mass media by higher levels (Morrill 1999).
Power is reflected in, and reproduced by, the
capacity to control and capture resources from
different levels. The scale (and levels) at which a
problem is experienced, analyzed, and discussed, or
“scale of meaning,” may not correspond to the scale
of the decision-making bodies (Towers 2000). One
of the objectives of intervention may, therefore, be
enabling the “scale capabilities” of the less powerful
(Rankin 2003). The ability to shift across levels and
scales is often important to social movements
(Williams 1999). The capacity to make use of scale
typically varies greatly among stakeholders
(Swyngedouw 1997b). Actors will often, therefore,
have to behave strategically to take advantage of
alternative scales of regulation and dependencies
(Cox 1998). Empowerment may necessitate
acquiring the capacity to work across multiple
scales. There is often a large gap between small
geographical areas where environmental and social
injustices take place and the larger administrative
or jurisdictional levels where they can be addressed
politically (Williams 1999).
The politics-of-scale metaphor has been stretched
to cover a lot of different relationships. In this paper,
we use this metaphor to refer to the situations where
different actors contest the spatial extent and
resolution of information and decisions, and
contrast this with the politics of place and position
(see Fig. 1). The “politics of position” refers to
politics among locations that depend on their
relative physical position, for example, between
upstream and downstream water users or those on
different banks of a river. The “politics of place”
refers to the unfolding of power relations among
stakeholders that arise because of the special
characteristics of the places interacting above and
beyond those arising from levels or position.
In this paper, we illustrate these three kinds of
politics—and how they are inter-related—with
examples from the governance of water resources
in the Mekong region. The paper is organized into
four main parts. The first introduces the main basins

in the region and their development histories. The
second illustrates the ways the politics of scale,
place, and position have unfolded around water
issues in the Mekong Region. The third considers
some institutional mechanisms and actor strategies
that help explain why cross-level and cross-scale
dynamics are a critical feature of politics in this
region. The final part reflects on the value and
limitations of the distinctions drawn between scale,
place, and position, and what they imply for
understanding and actions to enhance water
governance in the Mekong region.
WATER IN THE MEKONG REGION
The Mekong region is taken here to cover Myanmar
(formerly Burma), Thailand, Lao PDR, Vietnam,
Cambodia, and those parts of China, primarily in
Yunnan province, through which the upper reaches
of the main rivers in the region pass. Therefore, the
major rivers of interest are, from west to east, the
Irrawaddy, Nu-Salween, Ping-Chao Phraya,
Lancang-Mekong, and Yuan-Hong (or Red) (Fig.
2). Fish and other aquatic organisms have evolved
life cycles and migration patterns that are
synchronized with the predictable seasonality of
river flows in the region (Dudgeon 2003). The
cultural practices and livelihoods of rice farmers and
fishers, in turn, are often tuned to seasonal flood
regimes and associated resource dynamics.
For a variety of political and biophysical reasons,
water resources in the Mekong, Irrawaddy, and
Salween basins have remained relatively free of
large infrastructure, such as dams, river barrages
and diversion schemes (Kaosa-ard and Dore 2003,
The Economist 2004). Tension and conflict between
first colonial and then cold-war powers have kept
infrastructure investments modest and restricted to
easily extracted resources. Difficult terrain and river
morphologies made both overland journeys and
river navigation slow, and engineering challenges
large. The Thai-Lao friendship bridge between
Nong Khai and Vientiane, which opened in 1994,
was only the second bridge across the mainstream
of the Mekong River and the first in the lower part
of the basin. The first mainstream dam on the
Mekong River, for example, at Manwan in China
was not completed until 1993 (Economy 2004b).
The mainstream of the Salween, the second largest
river in the region, still remains un-dammed,
although there are numerous hydropower plans. The
flows of the Ping-Chao Phraya in Thailand and Red
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Fig. 1. A schematic representation of the politics of scale, position, and place around regional water
resources. Dark thick arrows represent political relationships (e.g., contests, conflicts, negotiations) between
different area (shaded). Solid lines represent rivers and the light-shaded area represents the river basin.
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Fig. 2. The main rivers and national boundaries of the Mekong region.
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Fig. 3. A conceptual model of some of the main dynamic processes driving water and water-related resource
politics in the Mekong region.
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in Vietnam have been altered a lot more, both
historically with major irrigation canals or dykes,
and more recently with larger dams for hydropower
generation (Molle and Keawkulaya 2000).
Looking to the future, the drivers for increasing
water demand in the coming decades are strong (Fig.
3). States face rising demands for water to generate
electricity, to supply irrigation systems, and to
service new urban and industrial areas (Chenoweth
et al. 2001, Kaosa-ard and Dore 2003). There are
also increasingly strident demands for environmental
flows to protect fisheries and aquatic environments
(Fig. 3). At the same time, efforts to maintain water
quality and protect aquatic and floodplain
ecosystems have become increasingly difficult
(Dudgeon 2000, Economy 2004b).
China’s huge economy will require a lot of energy,
and some of this is going to come from hydropower
in the upper reaches of rivers that flow through the
other Mekong countries (Dore and Yu 2004).
Thailand and Vietnam will also need more
electricity. Agricultural production in Lao PDR,
Cambodia, and Myanmar would increase from
intensification of cultivation made possible by
irrigation.
Economic and political integration also means that
key drivers and associated policy levers are
increasingly multi-level and beyond the control of
individual governments (Fig. 3). Mechanisms for
international cooperation and negotiation, however,
remain partial and weak. The Mekong River
Commission (MRC) is ineffectual and often
sidelined by its own member states. For the Salween
river basin, there is still no organization for
facilitating international cooperation. The ensuing
spatial politics over water are likely to grow more
intense and create demands for new institutional
mechanisms to negotiate, legitimize, and secure
competing claims to water and the sharing of
involuntary risks imposed by each other’s
development strategies.
POLITICS OF SPACE
Scale
A common justification for ceding water resource
decision making to national-level agencies is that
centralized coordination, command, and control is

needed to ensure supply and fair allocation. Local
management, it is argued, is too complex and prone
to vested interests to be effective in all but the finestscale operations, for example, maintaining canals
and weirs, or micro-allocation among fields.
Smaller governance units are less accountable. The
appropriate levels are, therefore, mostly national or
large administrative areas that may not even match
major river basins. The bureaucracies of the state,
it is argued, can then undertake planning and
decision making on behalf of the public or national
interest.
Conflicts over water in the Mekong region,
however, are often more nuanced than a contest
between monolithic state and united community
interests (Hirsch 1998, Mitchell 1998). Rather, both
state and local communities pursue diverse agendas
(Hirsch 1997). Part of the state may support certain
water uses, e.g., for industry and power generation,
whereas another set of both state and non-state
actors may resist or be in favor of alternative uses
and arrangements. In late 2004 in China, for
example, the central government suspended the
building of a cascade of dams on the Nu-Salween
being pursued by the Yunnan provincial
government (Dore and Yu 2004, Economy 2004a)
in favor of a coalition of civil society groups critical
of the projects.
In the deltas and valleys with a long history of rice
cultivation, access to water for irrigation is
perceived as a fundamental right (Molle et al. 2001).
Pre-existing community-based irrigation systems
may persist within and interact with more recent
state projects (Pearson 1999). In this institutional
context, politics of scale are strong, and attempts to
rapidly or radically restructure rights or institutional
arrangements are often impossible to carry out.
Instead, states move stealthily, hiding cross-scale
issues, and through modernization projects, allow
markets for land and labor to silently complete their
goal of transforming the level of water management
and governance upward. Communities and
households may resist through withdrawing labor
for maintenance or through using pumps and wells
to, technically speaking, “steal” water they feel is
theirs by right.
In the Mekong region, it is not unusual for
community-based management systems for water
to arise in part because of the failure of state-based
arrangements. Wittayapak and Dearden’s study of
four community-based watershed management
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regimes of differing spatial extent, ranging from 70
to more than 25 000 ha, was consistent with
commons literature in finding that management of
smaller watersheds with fewer users and clearer
boundaries was more effective (Wittayapak and
Dearden 1999). Moreover, management structures
arose without a formal authorizing framework—the
watersheds are legally state property, but treated by
the local populations as communal property.
The success of environmental movements and
continuing economic growth in Thailand led to a rescaling of development strategies to the regional
level (Hirsch 1995). Since 2004, the Thai state is
once again marketing a collection of infrastructure
projects under the guise of a “Thai water grid” that
includes diverting substantial amounts of water
from basins in Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Cambodia
to Thai consumers. The re-scaling is astute. The
Thais, as project beneficiaries, will all be at the end
of the tap, whereas the socially and environmentally
“sensitive” activities will take place beyond
Thailand’s borders.
It is easier to cut trees and build dams in neighboring
countries and then import electricity and timber.
Thus, most of the power that would be produced by
the Nam Theun 2 dam on the Mekong tributary in
Laos, Jinghong dam on the mainstream of the
Lancang-Mekong in Yunnan, and Tasang dam on
the mainstream of the Salween in Burma is destined
for export to Thailand. Électricité de France, the
Huaneng Group in China, and Greater Mekong
Subregion Power Public Co. Ltd, a subsidiary of
MDX group of Thailand are leading investors for
each of the projects, illustrating how the investment
activities of large private sector actors do not fall
neatly into spatial hierarchies, but more into socialnetwork-like scales (see Fig. 1 in Cash et al. in
preparation).
The Nam Theun–Hinboun Dam is a 210 MW
hydropower plant located downstream of the Nam
Theun 2 dam project site on the same Mekong
tributary. The project was completed in 1988. Like
Nam Theun 2 it is a project involving an inter-basin
transfer to take advantage of height differences.
Although the basin falls entirely within Lao PDR,
some actors chose to frame it as a regional project,
arguing that surplus generation capacity could be
sold to Thailand (Hirsch 2001).
The role of international financial institutions (IFIs),
such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and

World Bank, has been central in large-scale
development of regional water resources. The
World Bank has funded almost all of Thailand’s
major hydropower projects in the past four decades.
The guarantees by IFIs remain crucial, especially
for projects in countries like Lao PDR perceived as
a high economic risk for foreign investment.
Commercial banks are wary of making deals with
the communist regime in Lao PDR without World
Bank guarantees that their loans would be repaid
(The Economist 2003). The ADB, for example,
stepped in to finance the above-mentioned interbasin transfer project in central Lao PDR. The
government of Laos struggled for more than a
decade before it was able to convince the World
Bank to provide “financial risk guarantees” for
investors to build the Nam Theun 2 dam.
One of the most critical but uncertain issues within
the Mekong region is what happens to social justice
and sustainability when issues are re-scaled at
progressively higher, regional levels (Hirsch 2001).
The ADB and its Greater Mekong Sub-region
(GMS) program is a good example of “resetting the
spatial level” of analysis and development planning
to a higher regional level beyond that of individual
nation states (Asian Development Bank 2002).
Since the program began in 1992, the water sector
has probably been the most controversial part of its
program and a frequent focus of public protests
challenging “regional-level” vision with alternative
local-level perspectives.
Several key Thai non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have progressed from being largely focused
on a domestic viewpoint to becoming increasingly
interested in voicing a regional perspective. Notable
in this shift are the Southeast Asia International
Rivers Network (SEARIN) and Towards Ecological
Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA). The
shift in scale carries with it risks as well. Critical
civil society is at a nascent level in the countries of
the region, with the exception of Thailand.
Horizontal connections across nations are often
nominal or ceremonial. At the same time, even
efforts at civil society linkages run into trouble as
uneven power relations and politics of scale unfold.
For instance, at a meeting of the region’s civil
society groups in Bangkok in November 2005
where a new “Mekong People’s Council” was
declared, several observers commented that
perspectives of the host country, Thailand,
dominated.
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Some of the best examples of the politics of scale
as a struggle over this form of regionalization are to
be found in the history of the MRC and its precursors
the Mekong Committee and Interim Mekong
Committee (Jacobs 2002, Dore 2003). The MRC,
established in 1995 by an agreement among the four
lower basin countries—Cambodia, Lao PDR,
Thailand, and Vietnam—has struggled to provide a
workable institutional framework for water
resources development, sharing, and use. The
problem is not just the absence of China and
Myanmar, but also the unevenness of state-level
interests and power. The boundaries of the “Mekong
Basin” are regularly re-defined for convenience,
leaving out, for example, tributaries so that
tributary-based projects can go ahead even when
they have transboundary implications.
The MRC helps coordinate a hydrological
monitoring network across national agencies, and
maintains various water-related and, increasingly,
non water-related databases. It is strongly
dependent on the support of member state agencies
that have modest information-gathering capacities
(Chenoweth et al. 2001), difficulties of
communication, and periodic failures of trust. The
outcome has often been the aggregation of
information problems at larger spatial scales rather
than their resolution.
In political rhetoric, water resources can be rescaled
almost at will. Biophysical realities, however, put a
cap on dreams of ever-expanding supplies from
inter-basin diversions and new storage dams.
Scaling of ecological processes makes a difference
to key services like fisheries, flood protection, and
water purification. Although an ecological
orientation frequently results in arguments for
basin-based management, deciding the appropriate
levels or sub-systems may be difficult given the
complexity of human interventions in water
management (Sneddon 2002).
Position
The downhill flow of water creates an immediate
asymmetry among potential users, with the default
“first come, first served” applying at multiple levels
(Fig. 1B).
In the upper parts of the Chao Phraya basin, water
from the Ping River is re-distributed through a
system of overlapping state-controlled and

communal irrigation projects (Pearson 1999).
Politics of position play out at several different
levels. In the overall scheme, water allocation is
prioritized for urban Chiang Mai and the industrial
estate in Lamphun Province, which lie in the middle
and lower parts of the irrigation schemes on the west
and east banks of the river, respectively. Concerns
with poor quality of water that finally reaches
industry are leading to projects for direct delivery
systems that by-pass the return flows from
agriculture. Such infrastructure would further
privilege and secure industrial users’ water supplies.
Within the Mae Taeng system on the east bank,
different zones now receive very different amounts
of dry-season water, with the areas immediately
downstream from the city often short of water.
Because of this shortage of water and an increasing
shortage of labor, landowners have responded by
switching from rice to longan orchards. Water theft
through pumps and groundwater extraction is a
common way of adjusting to an otherwise insecure
supply. Within each canal, most of the allocation is
left to water user groups, often building on earlier
communal irrigation institutions. At this finest
scale, users are often left short. Additional
complexity is introduced by largely unregulated
extraction of water from irrigation channels by state
organizations, such as universities and military
bases, as well as private golf courses, resorts, and
factories.
The issue of trans-boundary impacts of water
storage and diversion is diplomatically the most
intense example of politics of position in the
Mekong region. Not surprisingly, China with
headwaters of most of the major rivers flowing
through steep terrain in Yunnan province (Fig. 2)
has major plans for building cascades of dams in
upper reaches. It considers these projects as critical
to energy security and a sovereign issue.
Downstream impacts, it is argued, are either
insignificant or dams would eventually prove
beneficial for flood protection, navigation, and dryseason agriculture (e.g., Plinston and Daming
1999). In early 2004, various groups began blaming
low and unusual fluctuations in the flow of the
Mekong River on the recently completed
Dachaoshan hydroelectric dam in China’s Yunnan
province (Pearce 2004a). This led to an emergency
meeting of the MRC and an “official request” for
information on dam operations from China (Pearce
2004b).
From the perspective of Cambodia, the key issue
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has remained the unacceptable risk that the
cumulative impact of upstream water use or
diversions in all the upstream countries on the flood
regime of the Tonle Sap ecosystem may adversely
affect the fisheries upon which tens of thousands of
people’s livelihoods depend. Freshwater flows to
the Mekong delta are also important controls on the
extent and strength of the seasonal influx of saline
waters into the delta areas within Vietnam.
The challenge of dam projects is that those areas
that benefit and those that pay are different places
and people (Beekman 2002). This immediately
creates the need for negotiation and compensation
that is not always forthcoming easily, and hence
conflict arises. Dams transform water resources, rescaling services in a profound way, making them
available to different user groups, and changing
ecological processes. A process Beekman (2002)
appropriately likens to the export of land and water.
Unannounced water releases from the Yali Falls
Dam in Vietnam into the Se San River have led to
loss of life and damages to livelihoods of fishers and
farmers living along the river’s banks in Cambodia
(Ojendal et al. 2002). The struggle of minorities to
have the issue recognized (Hirsch and Wyatt 2004)
is a poignant example of the politics of position.
Politics of position may sometimes lead to
investment cooperation or “deals.” China has
maintained good relations with Myanmar, the other
non-member country of the MRC. Mynamar
currently receives no aid from major donors because
of the dictatorship regime and human rights abuses.
Today, the country’s largest hydropower plants are
built one after another by Chinese companies, such
as Yunnan Machinery and Equipment Import and
Export Corporation and China National Heavy
Machinery Corporation. The projects include the
790-MW Yeywa hydropower station in Mandalay,
the 280-MW Paung Laung power plant near
Pyinmana, and the 400-MW Shweli power project
in northern Shan State (Anon. 2005b, c). China’s
interest is not limited to hydropower development.
In 1997, an expert study concluded the feasibility
of a high quality road connection between Dehong
Prefecture in Yunnan Province and Bhamo in
Myanmar with a water route along the Irrawaddy
on to Yangon (Bert 2004), and thus an Indian Ocean
seaport.
Politics of position also arise between opposite
banks (Fig. 1B). Major rivers are often borders
between major jurisdictions. The Salween and

Mekong rivers, for example, form long sections of
international borders. Navigation improvement
projects involving blasting of rapids and removing
shoals on the Lancang-Mekong, for example,
rekindled debates and negotiations between
Thailand and Laos over the precise demarcation of
the borderline. In this instance, the MRC was
sidelined while China was able to reach agreements
with Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos (Dore 2003).
The events also resulted in protests by groups
representing downstream fisheries interests
(Samabuddhi 2002). Dams too, it is recognized, will
create diplomatic challenges over demarcation of
national territory in the flooded areas (Techawongtham
2003).
Inter-basin diversions engineer new relations
among places. Several inter-basin transfers from
Mekong and Salween to augment supplies in Chao
Phraya basin in Thailand have been proposed and
are currently being explored (Achakulwisut 1998,
TERRA 1998, Anon. 2005a). The Theun-Hinboun
dam was a run-of-river structure promoted by the
ADB as environmentally friendly because, for
example, the reservoir basin is small. The interbasin diversion, however, had major impacts on
fisheries and associated livelihoods in both
tributaries (Hirsch 2001). The altered flow regimes
essentially reconfigured both the Theun-Kading and
Hai-Hinboun river ecosystems. The inter-basin
transfer represented the triumph of national and
regional level interests over local basin interests.
The downstream impacts, however, generated a new
politics of position out of what had started as a
politics of scale.
Place
A lot of water politics, and institutional design
effort, is aimed at overturning the physical bias of
gravity that favors upstream users. In many states,
these efforts have been so successful that now water
users in downstream regions are given preferential
treatment. In Vietnam, dykes and reservoirs are
managed to protect Hanoi from seasonal flooding
by shunting, when necessary, flood waters into
districts that historically were not flooded. Similar
responses are found for the cities of Bangkok,
Chiang Mai, and Hat Yai in Thailand (Lebel et al.
2005, Manuta et al. 2005). In times of shortage, on
the other hand, industry and urban areas, especially
the capital Bangkok, get the water and electricity
they need to grow, first. Water is allocated to higher
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economic value sectors first (Molle 2002). In the
Chao Phraya basin, the Electricity Generating
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) releases 2–8 billion
m3 each dry season from the Bhumiphol and Sirikit
dams for distribution by the Royal Irrigation
Department to 25 “irrigation” projects. The dams
also produce a small amount of electricity.
“Highest” priority is given to Bangkok’s water
supply, then to prevention of saline intrusion, to
orchards and shrimp ponds, with inland transport
and rice last. Although irrigation has the largest
share on average, it still only gets what is left after
other flows have been allocated, with the
consequence that there are large fluctuations from
year to year, and sometimes not enough water for
irrigation because the irrigable land area has already
extended beyond the capacity of the basin once
demands from other sectors are considered. With
capitals in the deltas, the politics of place (Fig. 1C)
trump position.
Another form of politics of place is the symbolic
use of sites of victory or unfair loss to gain leverage
in new settings. For Thai activists, the construction
of the Pak Mun dam against local opposition, and
the state abandonment of the Nam Choan Dam
project play these opposite symbolic roles. There
are, however, limits to shifting politics of place from
one place to another, especially across national
boundaries.
The 2400-MW Son La hydroelectricity dam in
Vietnam is the largest dam in mainland Southeast
Asia outside China. It is designed to also supply
water for irrigation in the dry season and flood
protection in the rainy season. It is upstream from
the existing Hoa Binh Dam on the Da branch of the
Red River. Approved in December 2002,
construction started after delays in 2005 and could
result in displacement of more than 90 000 people
predominantly from ethnic minorities. The
resettlement process has been strongly contested
and negotiations over compensation continue.
International and domestic NGOs are supporting the
process, drawing on experiences in other locations.
Finally, some of the fiercest politics of place take
place within a narrow group of similar but powerful
stakeholders. For example, the 2002 restructuring
of the power sector in China saw the China State
Power Corporation become 11 independent firms
(Dore and Yu 2004). The five power-generating
companies within this set received regional
hydropower assets, including potential ones like the

Nu-Salween river that went to the China Huadian
Corporation and the Lancang-Mekong that went to
the Huaneng Group. The political repercussions are
likely to unfold first as a politics of place among
these large firms with close political connections
and then literally cascade into a politics of position
over impacts in downstream locations and nations.
National “rice bowls,” state capitals, and dam sites
each have their own politics of place that transcends
politics of scale and position.
STRATEGIES AND RELATIONS
In this section, we explore in more detail some of
the underlying mechanisms generating the diverse
pathways along which the three forms of politics of
space unfold (Fig. 4). We cluster these into four
main groups, recognizing that these overlap: telling
stories, building alliances, deliberating, and
controlling technologies.
Telling Stories
In politics, actors tell stories to forward their
interests. Issues of scale, place, and position feature
prominently. There are competing stories about the
benefits and disasters resulting from control being
vested in authorities at various levels. There are
stories about places where every last drop of water
is used and everyone is happy. There are stories of
position about death and destruction to lowland
farms and cities from the activities of upland
farmers. There are stories about great victories of
resistance by local communities over states and
counter-stories of well-meaning officials leading
poorly educated peasants out of poverty through
regional development of water resources.
Stories vary greatly with respect to sources and
quality of knowledge they draw upon, and need not
depend on evidence-based reasoning. Hearsay,
prejudice, and myths abound. Deforestation myths,
in particular, have figured prominently in watershed
and water resource management debates in the
Mekong region (Forsyth 1998, Blaikie and
Muldavin 2004). Upland cultivators are widely
blamed for sedimentation, droughts, and floods in
the lower reaches without much attention to details
of place, scale, or plausibility of magnitude of
impacts (Forsyth 1996, Laungaramsri 2000, Walker
2003). Differences in forest types and soils have
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Fig. 4. Examples of analytical questions about strategic relations of actors in space.

also often been ignored (Bruijnzeel 2004). Although
a substantial body of research has focused on
measuring the impacts of changes in land use in
upper tributary watersheds on water delivery,
timing, and quality, no attention is given to issues
of lowland riparian deforestation and floodplain
disruption. Advocacy work by social scientists has
played a significant role in the Mekong region in
creating counter narratives focused on the “local”
(Lebel et al. 2004).
Molle shows how several popular arguments in
favor of water pricing in Thailand are based on
tenuous logic, but which through repetition have
come to pass as conventional wisdom (Molle 2002).

Thus, a common claim made is that farmers are
inefficient users of water, and that they waste water
because it is free. Here, the scale of analysis is
crucial. If you look at individual farms or even staterun irrigation projects, calculated efficiencies run
often as low as 30%. However, at the macro and
basin scales, you will find that in the dry season
overall efficiency of controlled water use is as high
as 88% for the Chao Phraya Basin (Molle et al.
2001). At the larger scale, efficiency is high because
much of the return flow from fields and canals is reused downstream or sub-surface flows are
recaptured by wells into shallow aquifers. Keller
and colleagues in their review of integrated water
resources management note that “efforts to increase
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irrigation efficiency at micro-level often lead to
reduced irrigation efficiency at macro-level”
(Keller et al. 1996). Moreover, farmers in the lower
Chao Phraya basin now need to use pumps to access
water because the flows by gravity alone are not
adequate. This is costly and is one of the factors
already leading to more efficient use of irrigation
water and substitution of wet rice cultivation (Molle
2002).
Crisis narratives (e.g., “not enough water to grow
food” or “not enough energy for tomorrow” or
“ecological catastrophe if dam is built”) can play an
important role in triggering or further opening up
space for change. Such stories may also be
manufactured by authorities as a way of gaining
public acceptance for what would otherwise be
controversial reforms or projects. Water shortages
in irrigation areas, for example, can with a little
clever manipulation of areas receiving water be used
to create “crises” that can then force farmers to
petition for more supply infrastructure. Rolling
black-outs or even the announcement of the alltime-high peak electricity demand are also a
persuasive prelude to calls for more hydropower.
Flood disasters can be played up to argue for more
funds and budgets for flood control infrastructure.
Water shortages can be manufactured. For example,
at the end of a normal monsoon season in late
November 2004, Thai bureaucrats and politicians
began discussing “the drought” that had hit the
region. Unashamedly, in the same week, they also
began releasing information about new water
infrastructure projects being planned to “stave off”
future droughts.
The most sophisticated and ambiguous stories
emerging in the Mekong region are those about
integrated water resources management (Biswas et
al. 2005). Integration is liberally interpreted.
Integration is an argument for shifting planning and
coordination upward a level (toward the state) or
downward (toward communities) in co-management
arrangements. For others, integration is a synonym
for new infrastructure. Engineers, through diversion
tunnels, canals, and pipes, can transfer large
amounts of water between basins and can thus shift
the feasible level of physical control.
Assessments are special kinds of stories—they are
knowledge rich, and intended to represent to the
public a sincere expert judgement about what is
known. Comparative studies of international
environmental assessments, however, suggest that

an assessment is more likely to be influential in
shaping policy if all stakeholders simultaneously
perceive it as legitimate, credible, and salient (Cash
and Moser 2000, Social Learning Group 2001).
Achieving a reasonable balance for assessments
concerned with individual projects has proved
difficult in the Mekong region. An impacts
assessment of the Yali Falls dam on the Se San river
in Vietnam, for example, was truncated to consider
only the immediate downstream vicinity within
Vietnam and did not consider more distant impacts
in Vietnam or neighboring Cambodia (Ojendal et
al. 2002), which turned out to be substantial (Hirsch
and Wyatt 2004).
Arguably even more important is the assessment of
the cumulative impacts of water infrastructure
development in the region. Such exercises need to
handle not just politics of place (between
conservationists and irrigators or power generators),
but also of the politics of position and scale. A
technically interesting, but not influential,
cumulative assessment has been completed for Nam
Theun 2 (Asian Development Bank 2004). The first
5-year plan of the Mekong Committee concentrated
on cooperative data gathering (Wolf 1997). This
helped build legitimacy while setting precedents for
cooperation. The MRC has also carried out various
evaluation studies, starting with the Mekong River
Basin Diagnostic Study (Mekong River Commission
1997), and in more recent times, has re-packaged
state of the environment reports. Unfortunately,
basic information on many key aspects of
biodiversity and ecosystem functions in the major
rivers of the region is poor (Dudgeon 2003), in
addition to still substantial uncertainties with
respect to hydrology. This undermines the
credibility of assessments that take place largely
behind closed doors or with limited public
consultation, such as the World Bank’s preparatory
work for the Mekong Water Resources Assistance
Strategy.
The capacity to control and manipulate information
flows—how stories are re-told—across levels and
scales is critical in the politics of space, and a tool
of domination of the worst kind in authoritarian
states like Myanmar. Participation and formal
separation of powers can help prevent actors from
a single level or place unfairly dominating
deliberations. Moreover, diverse participation
brings in diverse knowledge needed to match the
multiple levels of water resources management.
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Building Alliances
Actors create and then coalesce around stories
because they find their interests or values
represented in them. Stories help actors identify
shared interests and understandings. In the
management of regional water resources, the
capacity to make links with actors at other levels,
both upward and downward, in management and
administrative hierarchies is often critical to
maintaining or strengthening power and influence.
Associating with or standing against particular
places is also a key stratagem. The most difficult,
but ultimately the most rewarding outcome is
achieved when important subsets of up- and
downstream users can negotiate deals that leave
them with shared controls and benefits. The building
of alliances is an important strategy in the politics
of place, position, and scale.
Coalitions form when they are needed, e.g., in
polarized debates that are hard to win alone. The
broad coalition that has been formed across different
professions (journalists, NGOs, academics,
lawyers, among others) over the controvertial NuSalween cascade dam plan is a good example. The
strategy of the weak at lower levels is to build
coalitions with a large number of actors working at
the same level so that together they can claim
increased legitimacy through weight of numbers.
Lao and Thai villages on opposite banks of the
Mekong cooperate to voice, and sometimes address,
common concerns, such as requesting Chinese ships
to reduce speeds as their wakes accelerate bank
erosion. Upland farmers from various ethnicities
formed a network of watershed networks across
northern Thailand to challenge state watershed
policies (Ayudhya 1996, Laungaramsri 2002).
Links to other levels of authority were important for
the protests organized under the umbrella of the
Assembly of the Poor, starting out of the struggles
against the Pak Mun dam in northeast Thailand in
1995, and culminating in long-term protests in
Bangkok by multiple groups (Baker 2000,
Missingham 2003). This is perhaps one of the more
striking examples of coalitions forming across
unlikely groups, with ultimately, strong support and
deals even being made with the Thai Rak Thai party
of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (Phongpaichit
and Baker 2004). Sneddon (2002) emphasized the
importance of locals linking to Bangkok-based
NGOs to “jump level” and influence debate over
water pollution problems in the Nam Phong river

basin. For groups seeking to resist projects with
international funding, cooperation with NGOs in
other countries is often critical. At the same time,
national and international coalitions encounter
many difficulties especially in terms of power
dynamics, representation, and accountability. Local
groups may be disempowered or feel marginalized
when they are involved in large and sophisticated
national or international campaigns.
Deliberating Alternatives
Multi-stakeholder platforms hold promise for an
alternative constructive politics of scale, place, and
position outside the confines of water bureaucracies
and boardrooms. Platforms come in many forms,
from government review committees, public
hearings and dialogues through to open and free
exchanges in the media. Their relationship to
decision making also varies from advisory to
unconnected.
In the Mekong region, poor political rights, a lack
of independence in the media, and undemocratic
institutions often constrain the introduction of
effective platforms. Powerful actors are still able to
set and shape agendas and derail processes that
threaten their interests. Spatially related tactics we
have observed include: 1) constraining meaningful
participation to actors from a single level or place;
2) treating new projects as part, or extensions of,
earlier ones; 3) introducing parts of a grand scheme
(that, as a whole, would not be supported) piece by
piece, in less threatening sub-projects and not
revealing the full extent of the design until it is too
late to retreat; 4) stacking the set of options under
consideration with weakly developed or strawman
level and place options; and 5) maintaining control
over key decisions by embedding them in low-level
operations of the bureaucracy as procedures like
irrigation schedules, water operating rules, and
seasonal allocation plans.
Much has been written about decentralization trends
in the Mekong region. Much remains unread by its
bureaucracies. Nevertheless, there is hope that
innovative dialogues could bring together diverse
stakeholders from different levels and in doing so
help produce the kind of political institutions and
norms that are the core of good governance. Sharing
of knowledge and opening up of spaces for
deliberation, however, need to be followed up by
action at higher administrative levels, and they need
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to be followed through to the point of legislation
and implementation (e.g., Pichyakorn 2003).
Controlling Technologies
Technologies are a neglected aspect of spatial water
politics. Water management technologies may both
enhance or erode scale dependencies. Large- and
small-scale hydro-electricity generation have
different distributional consequences for electricity,
with the latter literally empowering relatively more
local actors (Bakker 1999). Irrigation devices, e.g.,
weirs, canals, and gates, enable control of water
allocation among urban and agricultural users and
between irrigation districts at least up to a certain
scale (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002). They
have increasingly come under control of state
agencies. On the other hand, drills for making bores
and electric or diesel water pumps can help
individual water users get around state-controlled
water infrastructure. The same is true for watertreatment facilities and the infrastructure for piped
water supply for domestic consumption. The
underlying rationale that says large-scale
infrastructure projects are needed to secure drinking
water supplies or provide electricity to rural schools
or water for crops in the dry season can often be
challenged by careful consideration of alternative
smaller-scale technologies that remain under
control of more local authorities including
communities. Consider, for example, how rainwater
tanks, small run-off dams, and other rain-harvesting
techniques can alter water security in rural areas, or,
how micro-hydro projects can provide electricity
available to remote upland communities. The issue
cannot be reduced to arguments about relative
economic efficiency and demands for resource
commodification. Resource access and control also
differ, matter, and vary spatially.
Water devices and technologies vary in investment
characteristics, sharing opportunities, plausible
property rights, and the way benefits and risks are
distributed. They are rarely neutral with respect to
scale, let alone place or position.
WINDOWS OVERLOOKING THE
MEKONG
Increasing interconnectedness of the economies of
the Mekong region, despite the huge differences in
rates and histories of economic growth, creates new

opportunities for cooperation in development of
water and water-related resources at many levels
and locations. The exploration and consequences of
alternatives are contested. In this paper, we have
shown that there is analytical value in distinguishing
politics of scale, place, and position. The politics of
space offer a window into the complex world of
water governance in the Mekong region.
Acknowledging how actors’ interests may be bound
to particular levels, spatial relationships, and places
helps make the case for more innovative
mechanisms that bring multi-level and multicentered interests to a common forum.
Over time, the interaction of diverse, scaled interests
with ecological changes that are also diverse,
complex ,and multi-level results in institutional
arrangements that are inevitably redundant,
incomplete, and only partially coordinated across
levels and scales in a way that does not coherently
fit any scale characterization of the world. In early
2000, Thailand had 32 specific laws related to water
that were applied by 40 government agencies in nine
ministries (Kaosa-ard 2001). Eliminating “redundancies”
and unifying through bundling and simplification
of local institutions, however, may not be the best
way of securing livelihoods (Bruns and MeinzenDick 2003, Lebel et al. 2004). Rather than seeing
an untidy structure as a problem, however, we
should be open to the possibility that such
arrangements are, through the interplay of
institutions they induce, more resilient than
counterparts that are more centrally designed
according to a narrow viewpoint and scale logic
(Meadowcroft 2002, Lebel et al. 2004).
New mechanisms of governance are needed that do
not shirk complexity arising from cross-level and
cross-scale dynamics (Sneddon et al. 2002, Young
2002). At the same time, uncertainties and
complexities suggest humbleness. Interventions in
the flow of rivers and their management institutions
should be “safe to fail” rather than “fail safe.”
Interventions at a particular level or place may
create unintended side-effects at other levels or
places. For example, structural measures aimed at
reducing risks of flood disaster may just shift those
involuntary risks onto those least able to cope with
them (Lebel et al. 2005, Manuta et al. 2005).
Regional cooperation does not have to be just about
mega-projects, but rather could start with sharing of
knowledge and experience around smaller, locally
tested, social and technological innovations.
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Strengthening quality of water management in
upper tributary watersheds and local irrigation
systems and municipalities may do more for
livelihood security than large and costly water
infrastructure projects (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick
2003). Public trust can be built over time through
small successes, where it may not come easily with
the for-all-time solution. This applies not only to
engineering feats but also to institutional ones.
This paper demonstrates limits to the politics-ofscale metaphor when applied to regional water
resources. Some key differences and contested
relations do not fit neatly into the hierarchical
ordering from small to big that spatial scale thinking
implies. Interests are not always closely aligned
with particular levels. Politics of position have
different dynamics to those of scale, although the
two are often inter-related. It is tempting to view all
upstream-downstream and opposite-bank relations
as indicating politics of position, but this is not
always the case. Place matters as well.
The era of relatively peaceful cooperation and
shared economic prosperity in the Mekong region
provides an international relations context in which
bringing actors from multiple levels to a common
forum is a possible. The key, we assert, is to shift
water politics in the Mekong region from a
centralized, technocratic, and coercive mode fearful
of citizens and science to a more integrated and
deliberative mode open to greater public
participation in decision making about water
projects, laws, and policies.
There are many windows opening over the great
rivers of the Mekong region, from the Irrawaddy
across to the Huan. How far and what different
people see varies tremendously. That is why politics
of place, position, and scale are each critical to water
governance.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol10/iss2/art18/responses/
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